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The aim of this paper is to map and contrast recent developments in 
attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Austria and Hungary. 
The context of the paper is that the economic and the so-called 
‘refugee’ crisis and its social and political consequences have 
fundamentally affected European attitudes towards solidarity. Such 
times of crisis are often seen as providing ample opportunities for the 
populist radical right to prosper. Nevertheless, the above 
developments do not necessarily mean a weakening of solidarity as its 
forms may change and its meanings become contested. 
Based on a comparison of Austrian and Hungarian results of the ESS 
round 8 (2016) the article – with the help of k-means cluster and 
multinomial logistic regression analyses – examines what solidarity 
positions can be observed and contrasted and how they may be linked 
step-by-step to 1) objective socio-demographic variables, 2) subjective 
perceptions at the micro-level (like social trust, well-being, and feelings 
of insecurity), 3) subjective perceptions at the macro-level (like 
institutional and political trust, attachment to country and the EU), 
moreover 4) to different values and attitudes like xenophobia, 
homophobia, conformism or statism on the one hand, and, 5) to 
political orientations and voting intentions on the other. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The countries of Europe in the past decade have been hit by a succession of crises 
that potentially altered the political and value landscapes of the affected societies. The 
financial and economic crisis of 2008 and afterwards led to policy measures in the EU 
such as strict austerity measures that prompted commentators to propose that 
international solidarity was dead (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Habermas, 2017; 
Balibar, 2010). The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 and the contradictory reactions of 
the EU as a whole and its Member States have raised similar questions. Solidarity, 
defined as a situation in which the well-being of one person or group is positively 
related to that of others (Oorschot, 1991), therefore appears to be central to 
understanding both crises. 
In the rich social scientific literature that discusses the consequences of the 
social, economic and political crises that have affected Europe over the past decade, 
there is often a taken-for-granted presumption regarding the relationship between 
socioeconomic changes of such scale and diminishing solidarity in the affected 
societies on the one hand and the rise of right-wing extremist political powers on the 
other. In the present paper, our aim is to provide a nuanced understanding of 
solidarity that encompasses both its inclusive and exclusive forms and its micro-, 
meso-, and macro dimensions. This distinction allows for an operationalized concept 
of solidarity that forms the basis of our cluster analysis. Furthermore, the creation of 
these clusters allows for the examination of a number of propositions regarding the 
relationship between solidarity and socio-demographic variables, personal values, 
attitudes and political behaviour. Such an analysis of the relationship between 
solidarity clusters in the two countries allows us to address the similarities and 
differences between the two countries and to investigate the explanations that may 
potentially underlie them. Our research questions are as follows:  
RQ1. What type of clusters are identifiable in the two countries, taking into 
account different formations of solidarity?  
RQ2. What is similar and what is country-specific about these clusters and their 
sizes?  
RQ3. What are the similarities and differences in structural and cognitive 
explanations between these clusters and in the countries under investigation?  
RQ4. How far is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right 
political radicalism?  
 
2. The concept of solidarity in the theoretical literature 
 
The relationship between crisis and attitudes towards solidarity has gained 
renewed attention in the scholarly literature, partly as a consequence of the succession 
of crises that hit the Western world. Here, we only point to three such important 
works. De Beer and Koster (2009) examine the impact of developments such as 
globalization and individualization on social solidarity, relying on international 
comparative data, including EVS and WVS. They find that, contrary to popular 
claims, there is no general tendency towards declining solidarity. This work is followed 
up by their research (2017) on the relationship between ethnic diversity and solidarity, 
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again relying on international comparison, where the findings are inconclusive in 
terms of whether increasing ethnic diversity results in less solidarity. 
The work of Lahusen and Grasso (2018) more specifically looks at solidarity in 
Europe, relying on survey data collected in 2016/2017 in eight countries (Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK). On the level of 
interpersonal forms of solidarity, they find that practiced solidarity is lowest towards 
fellow Europeans, higher towards people outside the EU, and highest at the national 
level. Regarding support for redistribution policies they find considerable differences 
between countries, with Mediterranean countries finding the elimination of 
inequalities to be most important. Regarding solidarity with people from outside the 
EU, respondents show strong conditionality.  
Regarding the relationship between solidarity and crisis, however, very little is 
known about the Central European countries that have been affected by –and reacted 
to –the developments of the past decade in a particular way. A comparison of Austria 
and Hungary provides useful ground for research for a number of reasons. 
Theoretically, it rests on considerations about most different conceptions of systems 
design (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe, 2009: 570), where the compared cases are 
different in relation to most variables but the variable of interest. Other than being 
geographically close and experiencing a similar succession of crises, the countries 
differ with regard to political, economic and social structure. This allows for the type 
of exploratory research design which is necessary for uncovering the dynamics that 
produce different attitudes towards solidarity. Practically, our focus on the two 
countries is founded on our research aim of validating the models and findings of 
independent research (SOCRIS, see later) that was carried out in the two countries.  
Solidarity is defined in the paper as a ‘situation in which the well-being of one 
person or group is positively related to that of others’ (De Beer and Koster, 2009, 12; 
Oorschot, 1991). This includes individual willingness to contribute to the welfare of 
others and also attitudes to institutional contributions to others’ welfare. We measure 
these attitudes at three levels: the micro-, meso-, and macro level. The micro-level 
refers to individualistic perceptions of deservingness of solidarity, the meso-level 
captures welfare chauvinist attitudes and welfare statism, while the macro-level refers 
to generally inclusive attitudes and attitudes towards migration. 
Inherent to the issue of solidarity is its scope – defining who belongs to the 
circle of solidarity. Arendt therefore makes a distinction between exclusive solidarity 
based on a commonality of interest and the ‘commonness’ of situation within a group 
of people, and inclusive solidarity which exists between those who suffer and those 
who make common cause with them (Bernstein, 1985). Such distinctions appear at all 
three of the above-described levels. Thus, lower degrees of conditionality for solidarity 
at all three (micro-, meso-, and macro-) levels correspond to more inclusive-, while 
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Figure 1. Formations of solidarity according to level and scope 
 
Before we move on to describe in detail the operationalization of solidarity formations 
on the one hand and the examined explanatory variables on the other, a few words 
about the research rationale of the present project are necessary. 
 
3. Research rationale 
 
The research rationale for the present paper originates in the ongoing SOCRIS 
project,1 an Austrian–Hungarian research project that addresses the consequences of 
the crises with a focus on solidarity. In order to obtain a better understanding of this 
context, we provide a short description of the project below. The research carried out 
between 2016–2019 consisted of a quantitative phase in which a survey (N=2500) was 
conducted in both countries where the population was restricted to active-aged 
respondents.  
Regarding solidarity, support for state help for disadvantaged social groups 
(pensioners, parents with many children and the unemployed) is significantly higher in 
Hungary. Support for state help for disadvantaged cultural minorities (refugees, the 
Roma) is stronger among respondents in Austria, but strongly correlates with higher 
social status in both countries. Analysing political attitudes, we found that in Austria 
right-wing extremism is closely connected to authoritarian, xenophobic, welfare 
chauvinistic and ethnocentric attitudes. Moreover, among FPÖ voters we found 
political alienation, mistrust of the state, rejection of state redistribution, and a lack of 
macro-solidarity. In the case of Hungary, we found a correlation between right-wing 
extremism and welfare chauvinism, authoritarianism and political disappointment; 
however, neither micro- nor macro-solidarity nor ethnocentrism played a role. To 
sum up, the social environment of right-wing extremist attitudes is much more defined 
in Austria and more diffuse in Hungary.  
An important analytical tool for grasping the complexities of solidarity was the 
application of cluster analysis to our data to identify different patterns of solidarity in 
the two countries. The four clusters identifiable in both countries were: full inclusive, 
                                                        
1 Funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, I 2698-G27) and National Research, Development and 
Innovation Office (NKFIA, ANN_2016/1, 120360). For more details, see: https://www.socris-
project.com/ 
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inclusive inactive, national exclusives, and non-solidarians. The largest group in 
Austria is that of the fully exclusive (19 per cent), while in Hungary it is the national 
exclusive (24 per cent). Non-solidarians, the smallest group, are practically the winners 
of recent ruling regimes in both countries. Feelings of meritocracy, appreciation, and 
strong social ties are more widespread in Austria, while feelings of injustice and poorer 
social attachments are more widespread in Hungary and also appear in explanations 
both of inclusive and exclusive types of solidarity. In Austria, inclusivism was found to 
correlate with attitudes of tolerance, having strong social ties and the rejection of right-
wing extremist political views. Exclusivism, on the other hand, is closely connected to 
authoritarianism and right-wing extremist attitudes. In Hungary, non-solidarians feel 
the most appreciated, can be described as xenophobic, have a social dominance 
orientation, and welfare chauvinistic attitudes. While full inclusives in Hungary have 
more social ties and are more tolerant than others, they also experience collective 
relative deprivation.  
While both SOCRIS and ESS round 8 (2016) were carried out roughly at the 
same time, SOCRIS had a research-problem-focused population that included active-
aged respondents, therefore the representative samples of ESS allow us to validate the 
models and findings of SOCRIS, and to obtain further analytical insight given the rich 
collection of variables of the ESS.  
In order to address these questions, cluster analysis was carried out on the 
Austrian and Hungarian database of ESS round 8 (2016), supplemented by 
multinomial logistic regression analysis. This paper is accordingly structured as 
follows: In the first section of the paper we provide a theoretical introduction to the 
concept of solidarity and clarify a number of distinctions significant for our purposes. 
Our focus here is limited to issues central to the present paper and we by no means 
claim to cover the theoretical complexities in their entirety. Then we move on to a 
discussion of theories regarding the determinants of solidarity, with an emphasis on 
socio-demographic variables, the role of the personal micro-world, macro-level trust, 
personal values, receptiveness attitudes, and political orientation. Afterwards, we 
present the findings of our empirical analysis and discuss our answers to the above-
listed research questions. 
 
4. The operationalization of formations of solidarity 
 
According to Zulehner, Denz, Pelinka and Tálos (1997: 54), solidarity is a central 
concept of social justice which can be distinguished at three main levels: micro, meso, 
and macro. We operationalized the different solidarity levels based on the literature 
and the opportunities offered by ESS Round 8,2 as follows: 
 
                                                        
2 Since further on we seek to construct a comparative longitudinal analysis of the period before and after 
the financial and so-called refugee crises, we have only picked out those variables in this report which also 
can be analysed in ESS Round 4 (where the rotating module is more or less identical with the recent 
one). Unfortunately, in this paper—because of limits on the scope—this comparative analysis-in-time is 
impossible. 
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4.1 Micro-level 
 
Understanding individualistic explanations of poverty has been at the forefront of 
research on perceptions of deservingness (Coughlin, 1980; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; 
Oorschot, 2000). As we will see later on, at this individual level the criteria of blame 
and blamelessness is a crucial factor. It could be argued that the rise of individualistic 
explanations of poverty should also be understood in the broader social context – 
namely, as a consequence of the ‘commodification of protection’ (Hadis, 2015: 4).  
Thus, micro-solidary attitudes are central to understanding broader societal 
shifts. The literature is consistent in finding that in their solidary attitudes most 
respondents in Western welfare states rank social groups by levels of deservingness, 
whereby old people deserve the most, the sick and the disabled less, needy families 
even less, and the unemployed the least (Oorschot, 2008: 269). Studies that add 
immigrants to this list find that the latter group is considered the least deserving. 
While numerous explanations exist to interpret these highly consistent findings, what 
is certain is that they do coincide with the chronological order in which state-funded 
social protection was introduced to support the respective groups. 
Another strand of research does not focus on ranking but the foundations of 
micro-solidarity. This approach examines whether people utilize individualistic 
explanations as foundations for their attitudes towards social inequality. It has been 
shown repeatedly that respondents who rely on such explanations tend to be less 
solidary; that is, less supportive of welfare spending and the social protection of the 
poor (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Oorschot, 2000). This heuristic is a close relative of 
the ‘culture of poverty’ concept born in the 1970s that claims that the value system of 
the poor contributes to the reproduction of poverty (Lewis, 1969). It is clear that in 
this formulation research situates respondents on an individualistic-societal dimension 
in terms of their understanding of deservingness. It should be noted however, that 
Oorschot and Halman also claim that a further, crosscutting dimension – that of 
blame-fate – also exists (2000: 5).  
Generally, regarding individual perceptions of recipients, deservingness is 
understood as a calculation of whether the target group has taken any steps to avoid 
their position or should be blamed for their neediness (Cavaillé, 2015). In Oorschot’s 
(2000) approach, deservingness is based on five principles: need (Are you needy?), 
control (Is your neediness your own fault?), identity/solidarity (Are you one of us?), 
attitude (Are you docile and compliant?), and reciprocity (What have you done, or 
can you do for us?).  
Micro-solidarity here measures whether people blame a ‘too generous social 
system’ and others who are in a disadvantaged position for exonerating themselves 
from responsibility (Oorschot, 2000). Values that correspond to lower levels of 
conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher 
levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity. 
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Table 1. Micro-solidarity (principal components in Austria and Hungary;  
component matrix scores) 







Social benefits/services make 
people less willing to care for 
one another  
0.81 0.73 0.77 
Most unemployed people do 
not really try to find a job 
0.76 0.74 0.75 
Many manage to obtain 
benefits/services they are not 
entitled to 
0.68 0.52 0.63 
Social benefits/services make 
people lazy 
0.86 0.81 0.83 




The meso-level of solidarity is understood here as a societal but nevertheless locally 
bounded dimension. The meso-level is the level of welfare expenditure, the scene of 
social policy measures. The latter is based on the principle of collective 
interdependence, trust and assistance, on the grounds of the principle of resource 
allocation (Beecher, 1986; Stjernø, 2005). 
On this meso-level, empirical research has found that one important European 
development is the strengthening of welfare chauvinism (Hentges and Flecker, 2006: 
140). Scholars trace the origins of this to Scandinavia, where its representatives started 
out opposing high taxation and bureaucracy. Eventually, these issues were 
supplemented with conflicts about socio-cultural and immigration-related issues 
(Rydgren, 2006: 165). The narrative blames migrants, leftists, and civil society for 
social problems that the former frame as having an ethnic nature (Rydgren, 2006: 
168–172), but blame can also be extended to the disabled, the unemployed and other 
inactives (Kaindl, 2006: 72). 
We conceptualize the meso-level within the boundaries of the state but based 
on the above considerations we also distinguish between two problems that belong 
here and that often appear as distinguishing features of inclusive and exclusive 
solidarity attitudes. The first concerns state help for disadvantaged social minorities; 
that is, solidarity within the community. The second concerns state help for 
disadvantaged cultural minorities (e.g. immigrants or refugees), where the issue 
concerns state help offered outside the bounds of the (national-social-political) 
community. 
Meso-solidarity can be measured by two different variable sets in ESS Round 8: 
the first one refers to welfare chauvinistic attitudes – that is, strong support for 
economic redistribution with opposition to welfare for immigrants (Hentges and 
Flecker, 2006: 140) – ,while the second one refers to welfare statism (Beecher, 1986; 
Stjernø, 2005); that is, support for strong state schemes that provide for ‘needy’ groups 
such as pensioners, the unemployed, and working parents. Values that correspond to 
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lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that 
correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of 
solidarity. 
Meso-solidarity 1 – welfare chauvinism (standardized index in Austria, only the first 
question was used in Hungary and on the merged file): 
 When do you think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits 
and services as citizens already living here?  
 Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring 
in their close family members. 
 
Table 2. Meso-solidarity 2 – welfare statism (principal components in Austria and 
Hungary; component matrix scores) 







Standard of living for the old 
is government’s responsibility 
0.87 0.82 0.85 
Standard of living for the 
unemployed is government’s 
responsibility 
0.83 0.73 0.80 
Child-care services for 
working parents is 
government’s responsibility 
0.85 0.73 0.80 




Macro-solidarity refers to support for the welfare state as a system as an 
institutionalized form of solidarity. In this case, society acts as a community that shares 
certain risks (Bayertz, 1998: 37). The question of how different goods and risks are 
shared and distributed amongst its members (through taxation, social services, etc.) is 
subject to political struggles. Societal solidarity or ‘society-wide’ solidarity (Laitinen 
and Pessi, 2015: 9) could therefore be considered a special form of group solidarity.  
Macro-solidarity is also a form of solidarity that is based on the interests of 
others, such as social redistribution on an international level – for example, between 
countries in the EU, or supporting the struggles of minorities in other countries. 
Accordingly, macro-solidarity is solidarity with strangers and foreigners (Denz, 2003). 
Therefore, it covers burden-sharing between different regions and actions regarding 
migration and refugee issues. This is the level of collective interdependence, trust and 
assistance, and the redistribution of sources based on need (Stjernø, 2005: 28).  
Macro-solidarity (or ‘altruistic solidarity’ by Voland, 1999: 158) is aimed at 
‘improving the situation of people who exist outside the horizon of personal interests’ 
(Bierhoff, 2002: 295) and is motivated by values, norms and the creation of feelings of 
moral obligations to others. Altruistic solidarity is linked to values connected to self-
transcendence, such as ‘helpfulness, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, social justice, a 
world at peace, inner harmony, equality, and unity with nature’ (Bierhoff, 2002: 285).  
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Macro-solidarity as an abstract dimension can be measured by two different 
variable sets: the first refers to general inclusive values concerning equality and 
altruism (Alexander, 2014; Voland 1999: 158), while the second one to migration-
related issues (Stjernø, 2005: 28; Denz, 2003). Values that correspond to lower levels 
of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to 
higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity. 
 
Table 3. Macro-solidarity 1 – equality and altruism (principal component in Austria 
and on the merged file, a standardized index in Hungary; component matrix scores) 








For a fair society, differences 
in standards of living should 
be small  
0.54 – 0.55 
Important that people are 
treated equally and have 
equal opportunities 
0.80 – 0.81 
Important to help people and 
care for others’ well-being  
0.79 – 0.79 
* total variance defined in brackets 
 
Table 4. Macro-solidarity 2 – tolerance (principal components in Austria and 
Hungary; component matrix scores) 







Allow many/few immigrants 
of same race/ethnic group as 
majority  
0.87 0.69 0.78 
Allow many/few immigrants 
of different race/ethnic group 
from majority 
0.93 0.87 0.92 
Allow many/few immigrants 
from poorer countries outside 
Europe 
0.91 0.79 0.89 
* total variance defined in brackets 
 
5. Determinants of solidarity background variables 
 
Beginning with socio-demographic factors, we investigate social status,3 gender, age, 
settlement size4 and migrant background.5 Status, work and income are all important 
                                                        
3 Social status aggregated from education, occupational position, and income per capita. 
4 1=big cities; 5=farms. 
5 A variable aggregated from items such as where the respondents and their parents were born, and 
whether they are citizens of the country. 
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values in modern Western societies (Ester et al., 1994). There is consensus in the 
literature that those at the lower end of the income and education ladder are less likely 
to show solidarity (Eurobarometer, 2011). Rydgren (2007) and Golder (2016) 
emphasize that those with lower status are mostly over-represented among voters of 
the new radical right and so also among supporters of exclusivist forms of solidarity.  
Radicalization and affinity with right-wing extremism, however, takes place not 
only among ‘losers’ but among winners of socioeconomic change as well (De Weerdt 
et al., 2007; Flecker, 2007). These winners hold attitudes such as a social dominance 
orientation, expressed chauvinism, prejudice against immigrants and authoritarian 
attitudes, and ultimately favour right-wing parties and exclusive types of solidarity.  
Moving on to our second group of factors – namely, the personal micro-world 
– we investigate the relationship between solidarity on the one hand and social trust,6 
social attachment,7 (personal network), and subjective well-being8 on the other. 
Social trust is an important basis for social relations and cooperative action and 
for solidarity (Schweer, 1997: 10). According to Frings, co-operation – extorted not by 
rules but by social bonds based on interpersonal trust – greatly increases the 
effectiveness of actors’ action (Frings, 2010: 15). Putnam supports the idea that 
solidarity and tolerance can only be effectively organized through well-functioning, 
mainly horizontal social networks; the norm of reciprocity can be established through 
these (Putnam, 2000: 134). Scholarly work on right-wing extremism stresses the 
importance of ‘individualisation,’ that is, the breaking up of traditional social 
institutions and norms that might lead to feelings of disorientation and insecurity, 
which are in turn capitalized on by right-wing extremist political actors (Heitmeyer, 
1992; Endrikat et al., 2002). Nationalism – for example – as an imaginary bond is 
offered by right-wing extremism as a substitute for a traditional collective identity 
considered as threatened or destroyed by modernization and the market (Gundelach, 
2001). According to Flodell, individual satisfaction and a lack of deprivation are 
important influential factors in the development of solidarity, too (Flodell, 1989: 108). 
Deprived persons, namely, are more likely to have unfavourable attitudes towards out-
groups (Kriesi et al., 1998; Vester, 2001: 299).  
Our third focus is the potential relationship between trust on a macro level 
(institutional trust,9 satisfaction with functioning of the country,10 EU/UN-related trust11) 
and solidarity. Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (1994: 16) emphasize institutional trust 
                                                        
6 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘most people can be trusted’ or you ‘can’t be too careful’; 
‘most people try to take advantage of you’, or ‘try to be fair’; ‘most of the time people are helpful or 
mostly look out for themselves.’ 
7 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘how often do you socially meet with friends, relatives or 
colleagues’; ‘how many people are there with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters’; ‘do 
you take part in social activities compared to others of same age.’ 
8 An aggregated variable made up of items like subjective general health; ‘how happy are you’; subjective 
income. 
9 An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in a country’s parliament; trust in the legal system; 
trust in the police; trust in politicians; trust in political parties. 
10 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘how satisfied are you with the present state of economy in 
[country]’; ‘how satisfied with the national government’; ‘how satisfied with the way democracy works in 
[country]’; state of education in [country] nowadays’; ‘state of health services in [country] nowadays.’ 
11 An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in the European Parliament and trust in the United 
Nations. 
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and institutionalized solidarity with various organizations and the protection of the 
commons against external threat (ecological, political, etc.) as a precondition for 
solidarity. Schweer believes that trust in politics and democratic institutions creates 
macro-solidarity by supporting the redistribution of wealth, whether at a regional, 
national, or even EU level (Schweer, 1997: 221). 
Regarding the relationship between personal values and solidarity, we examine 
the values of individualism12 and conformism.13 Thome sees in solidarity action a 
subjectively accepted obligation and a varied value system. However, belonging to a 
given group may not only strengthen, but by strong group-binding that leads to 
conformity also weaken inclusive dynamics (Thome, cited by Kraxberger, 2010: 6). 
So, non-conformism and, according to Winkler (2010), individualism, may strengthen 
inclusive forms of solidarity.  
A second group of personal values we investigate are norms related to equality,14 
statism15 and meritocracy.16 Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger also mention inclusive 
justice principles as prerequisites of solidarity (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger, 1994). 
Ressler (2002) stresses the importance of a welfare state, the original aim of which was 
to protect the weak and create equal opportunities, as opposed to the competitive 
nature of neoliberalism. According to Ullrich (2005: 237), statism is a standpoint that 
opposes a liberal or corporatist position and sees the state as a player responsible for 
resolving social problems, which also supports an inclusive-emancipatory conception. 
An important aspect of our research is an analysis of the relationship between 
receptiveness attitudes (xenophobic attitudes vs. tolerance,17 homophobic attitudes, 
and male-chauvinism– see Footnote 13 – and political powerlessness18) and solidarity. 
According to Zulehner et al. (1997), solidarity is based on diversity, acceptance and 
tolerance. That is, solidarity is a binding link that exists despite (accepted and 
tolerated) differences and inequalities. 
Intolerant behaviour is primarily manifested against people perceived as being 
non-equivalent or negatively assessed groups (Forst, 2000: 74). However, tolerance—as 
well as solidarity—always has a limit (Klein and Zick, 2013). Zick et al. (2011) ask the 
question which groups are accepted as part of society, and the extent to which social 
diversity and heterogeneity are desired (p. 18). They argue that intolerance poses a 
threat to democratically functioning societies because perceived differences can lead 
to the abolition of equalization, and discrimination (p. 11). 
                                                        
12 An aggregated variable made up of items like it is ‘important to think new ideas and be creative’; 
‘important to show abilities and be admired’; ‘important to make own decisions and be free.’ 
13 An aggregated variable made up of items like it is ‘important to do what is told and follow rules’; 
‘important to be humble and modest, not draw attention’; ‘important that government is strong and 
ensures safety’; ‘important to behave properly’; ‘important to follow traditions and customs.’ 
14 Such as gender equality: ‘men should have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce,’ or 
LMBTQ equality: ‘gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.’ 
15 ‘Government should reduce differences in income levels.’ 
16 ‘Large differences in income are acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.’ 
17An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘immigration bad or good for [country]’s economy’; 
‘[country]’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants’; ‘immigrants make [country] worse or 
better place to live.’ 
18 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘political system allows people to have a say in what 
government does’; ‘able to take active role in political group’; ‘political system allows people to have 
influence on politics.’ 
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The theory of political dissatisfaction and protest voting claims that those 
affected negatively by socioeconomic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they 
have no influence on political processes (Van den Burg et al., 2000). Exclusive 
attention to protest voting, however, is problematic, as large parts of the electorate 
demonstrate an affinity with right-wing extremism itself as well (Falter and Klein, 1994; 
Scheepers et al., 1995). 
Finally, our paper investigates the relationship between political orientation and 
solidarity. Ressler emphasizes that supporters of leftist parties are more inclined to 
support inclusive-emancipatory-universalist ideas, while right-wingers prefer exclusive 
forms of solidarity based on certain criteria (Ressler, 2002: 211). This is in line with 
Lefkofridi and Michel's thesis (2014) which defines left-wing social democratic 
attitudes as addenda to the services of welfare states, and right-wing ideologies as 
incentives for supporting exclusive solidarity. 
 
6. Empirical tests of different solidarity levels in Austria and Hungary 
 
To answer our question what coherent patterns of solidarity can be identified in the 
two countries and whether these are rather analogous dynamics or country-specific; 
moreover, whether the proportions of the former patterns within the countries are 
similar, we stratified groups of respondents based on the above-mentioned micro-, 
meso-, and macro-solidary dimensions (see the structure of the aggregated variables in 
Section 4 above). First, we used k-means cluster analyses in both countries, 
separately.19  
In both countries we were able to identify five more-or-less identical clusters with 
rather small differences: we named these ‘self-lifting,’ ‘national exclusive,’ ‘anti-
solidarian,’ ‘inclusive solidarian’ and ‘neoliberal-tolerant.’ 
 
Table 5. Austrian clusters (pairwise model, 47 iterations) 



















.24108 .66359 -1.37703 .45777 -.82045 
inequality – 
macro 
-.41509 .12892 1.02557 -.69350 .83353 
intolerance .17990 1.05288 .88909 -.88571 -.58136 
                                                        
19 All the scores in the cells of the tables show differences from the means (zero) of a standardized scale 
(indices or principal components). The higher the (positive) values, the stronger the influence of the given 
attitude variable on the characterization of the cluster, and the lower (negative) values, the greater the 
absence of the given attitude. 
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Table 6. Hungarian clusters (pairwise model, 29 iterations) 




















.70049 .79521 -.97442 -.04330 -.62631 
inequality – 
macro 
-.54593 -.16198 -.16398 -.31001 1.26950 
intolerance 
– macro 














Individuals in the cluster we called self-liftings blame the social system and people in 
need in both countries, are welfare chauvinistic (but only at an average level in 
Hungary20) and are also welfare statist at the meso-level. They support equality but are 
intolerant towards immigrants on a macro-level. Seemingly, they are sectarian 
equalitarian, so they only support equality and state-subsidies for the (merited) in-
group but dislike supporting out-groups. Their proportion is somewhat higher in 
Austria (28 per cent) than in Hungary (22 per cent). 
National exclusives show solidarity on a micro-level; they also support welfare 
statism (meso-level), but at the same time they are also welfare chauvinists (meso-level) 
and non-solidarians on the macro-level. Seemingly, they only favour those who belong 
to the political or cultural nation and would support them through welfare measures. 
Here we find one notable difference between the countries: respondents in Hungary 
in this cluster are rather egalitarian, while Austrians rather support inequality. This 
small difference may be explained by the different value orientations of citizens in 
these countries: namely, that Austria is rather an achievement-centered society, while 
Hungary is rather a statist one. The proportions of these clusters are 17–18 per cent in 
both countries. 
The members of the anti-solidary cluster are welfare chauvinistic and refuse all 
forms and levels of solidarity with one exception in Hungary: again, Hungarian 
respondents tend to support equality, but the difference from the average is rather 
                                                        
20 Here we had to measure welfare chauvinism using only one variable in Hungary.  
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small. This cluster is somewhat greater as a proportion of the total in Hungary (17 per 
cent) than in Austria (11 per cent). 
Inclusive solidarians show solidarity attitudes at all levels in both countries; 
however, they only support welfare statism on an average level in Hungary. This is 
probably due to the merger of leftist and (neo)liberal values after the system change of 
1989. The proportion of these clusters is around 24–25 per cent in both countries, 
thus this is one of the largest clusters among the solidary groups. 
The last cluster includes the so-called neo-liberal-tolerant. Respondents who 
belong here strongly support inequality and reject welfare statism, but also welfare 
chauvinism in both countries. Hungarian respondents demonstrate no micro-
solidarity, and their tolerance level is only average in this cluster. On the contrary, 
Austrian neo-liberals are clearly tolerant towards immigrants and do not blame the 
social system and people in need (micro-solidarity). So, those Austrians who belong to 
this cluster seem to understand that the functioning of the capitalist system and its 
dynamics unavoidably creates winners and losers within societies (and no one is to 
blame for this), while we find a rather social-Darwinistic version of neo-liberalism in 
Hungary. The proportion of these clusters is around 19 per cent in both countries. 
In summarizing our most important results here, we can state that the cognitive 
and structural dynamics that produce different types of solidarity are rather similar in 
Austria and Hungary. However, some important questions arise, such as: 
 first, whether the dynamics of cognitive structures and the relative 
weights/proportions of each cluster are also akin in international comparison; that is, 
can we declare that the two countries are not only similar related to their own average 
solidarity levels, but also that the absolute level of each type of solidarity is alike, or 
clearer and easier to identify: additionally, in which country do respondents 
demonstrate more inclusive or exclusive patterns of solidarity in statistical 
comparison? 
 second, whether similar cognitive structures may be explained by similar variables; 
i.e., are the cognitive and structural reasons for the different types of solidarity in the 
two countries analogous? 
 third, how much is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right 
political radicalism?  
 
6.1 Comparison of means of cluster-forming variables 
 
First, we compared the cluster-forming variables and the averages of the aggregated 
variables (on different micro-, meso-, and macro levels) in a merged data file (i.e., the 
Austrian-Hungarian population was treated as one unit). According to all variables and 
aggregate dimensions, we found that respondents living in Austria demonstrated more 
inclusivity concerning solidarity (the only exception was the level of micro-solidarity, 
where we did not find significant differences between countries). The largest 
differences appeared between levels of tolerance and welfare chauvinism; that is, 
Hungarian respondents show more intolerance and welfare chauvinism. 
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6.2 Common clustering 
 
The cluster structure we created using the merged file was practically identical with 
those created using the separate files, with small differences such as: the self-liftings 
cluster appeared more tolerant, and non-solidarians supported equality at an average 
level, just as was the case with neoliberal-tolerants’ level of micro-solidarity (the 
appearances of these average values are due to the fact that these values had different 
– positive/negative – directions in the two countries in the separate files). 
 
Table 7. Shared patterns (pairwise model, 45 iterations) 




















.40098 .70576 -.66303 .32579 -.87428 
inequality – 
macro 
-.43176 -.11825 .02052 -.57498 1.15366 
intolerance 
– macro 














We found important differences concerning proportions of inclusive-, national 
exclusive-, and non-solidarian patterns, however. Compared to Austrian respondents, 
there were twice as many Hungarian exclusivists (non-solidarians and national 
exclusivists), and four times as many Austrian inclusive solidarians as their Hungarian 
counterparts when the two countries were treated as one common European region 
(see Table 4.). It is worth noting that the cluster sizes hardly changed in Austria in the 
shared file compared to the country file, while radical changes were observed in the 
case of Hungary. This means that, compared to Austria, in Hungary the inclusive-
solidarity cluster was not the biggest but the smallest one, while exclusivism clearly 
dominated the thinking of Hungarian respondents. 
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Table 8. Comparison of cluster sizes (proportions) created using different data files  
(as %) 











22% 24% 24% 7% 23% 
HU separate 
data file 








28% 17% 11% 25% 19% 
 
7. Explaining solidarity according to background variables 
 
To explain the memberships of respondents in different clusters we used step-by-step 
multinomial logistic regressions in both countries. Reference clusters were groups of 
non-solidarians both in Austria and Hungary. In the first models we only involved the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, social 
status, settlement type, and migration background (the second variable only in 
Austria). In the second step, we complemented the models with variables that 
belonged to the micro-world of individuals, such as religiousness,21 personal network, 
subjective well-being, feelings of personal security,22 and social trust. Next, we 
complemented the models with variables related to individuals’ macro-world such as 
institutional trust, satisfaction with the functioning of the state, trust in international 
organizations, feeling of attachment to the country and the EU,23 political activity,24 
political powerlessness, and feelings of discrimination.25 In the last models we 
complemented the independent variable set with values and attitudes such as 
conformism, individualism, homophobia, xenophobia (intolerance), male-chauvinism, 
statism, and meritocracy. 
In the first model we found that, compared to the non-solidarian cluster, major 
demographic and social status indicators did not strongly explain the differences 
between the different solidarity clusters and the reference cluster. In Austria, members 
                                                        
21 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘how religious are you’; ‘how often do you attend religious 
services apart from special occasions’; ‘how often do you pray apart from at religious services.’ 
22 ‘Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark.’ 
23 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘how emotionally attached are you to [country]’; ‘how 
emotionally attached to Europe.’ 
24 An aggregated variable made up of items like ‘contacted politician or government official in last 12 
months’; ‘worked in political party or action group last 12 months’; ‘worked in another organisation or 
association last 12 month’s; ‘worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months’; ‘signed petition 
last 12 months’; ‘taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months’; ‘boycotted certain products 
last 12 months’; ‘posted or shared anything about politics online last 12 months.’ 
25 ‘Member of a group discriminated against in this country.’ 
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of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster have relatively higher status and are more likely to 
have a migrant background. Similarly, inclusive solidarians are more likely to have 
higher status and a migrant background compared to the reference cluster. In 
Hungary, higher social status only correlates with membership in the inclusive cluster. 
In the case of the other solidarity clusters there is no status effect. Overall, in both 
countries the demographic characteristics of respondents and differences in status did 
not have a strong influence on the formation of solidarity clusters.  
In the second model we tested the effects of people’s subjective well-being and 
micro-world interpersonal cognitive attitudes. In this case, explanatory potential 
increased significantly in both countries, but there were also some differences between 
them. In Austria, members of the inclusive cluster were more likely to have a migrant 
background, higher levels of social trust, and personal feelings of security, with more 
women belonging to this group. In Hungary, members have more social trust, higher 
social status, and stronger social networks, but less religiousness and higher levels of 
feelings of deprivation (less subjective well-being). Members of the neoliberal-tolerant 
cluster are more likely to come from a migrant background, have higher levels of 
social trust and feelings of personal security, with more women belonging to this group 
in Austria, while in Hungary they have more social trust, are less religious and more 
deprived (less subjective well-being). Among self-liftings in Austria there are more 
women, members live in smaller settlements, have a higher level of subjective well-
being and social trust, but are less religious, while in Hungary they are less religious 
and more deprived (less subjective well-being). Finally, in the case of national 
exclusives in Austria we find more women, less feelings of insecurity, and more 
people living in smaller settlements, while in Hungary there are more deprived 
individuals who live in bigger settlements. 
However, the biggest differences between Austria and Hungary were found in 
the third and fourth26 models among the different solidarity clusters compared to the 
non-solidarity cluster (for the most significant results, see appendix). In these models, 
we tested the effects of macro-level attitudinal variables and values. In the case of 
Austria, behind the different solidarity clusters we identified a wide variety of cognitive 
setups. Members of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster show less meritocratic affiliation 
(more egalitarianism), less homophobia and xenophobia (more tolerance), less trust in 
supranational organizations, and lower attachment both to the EU and Austria. 
Moreover, members live in smaller settlements than the reference group. Among the 
self-liftings cluster, we found stronger feelings of being discriminated against, less 
religiousness, stronger attachment both to the EU and Austria, less meritocratic 
affiliation, more statism, less xenophobia (more tolerance), more individualism (more 
affinity to the free market), but also more conformism (stronger feelings of inferiority 
compared to political power), and more political powerlessness. In the case of the 
inclusive cluster there is less meritocracy, more statism and egalitarianism (concerning 
LMBTQ and women), more individualism, less religiousness and less xenophobia 
(more tolerance). Members come more often from migrant families and feel attached 
either both to Austria and the EU or to neither of them.  Finally, in the case of the 
national exclusive cluster we found less meritocracy, more conformism, more political 
                                                        
26 Explanatory powers of the fourth models – Hungary: McFadden R2 =.296; Cox and Snell R2 =.605 
Austria: McFadden R2 =.270; Cox and Snell R2 =.558. 
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powerlessness, less EU/UN trust, more institutional trust, and less feelings of 
insecurity. 
For Austrian respondents, it can be assumed that the macro-level attitudes and 
ideologies behind the individual solidarity clusters are not necessarily always coherent, 
but the value profiles of the groups are markedly different. From this we can conclude 
that solidarity cluster membership may be differentiated according to ideological and 
general macro-level – ideological and general – value choices. 
In the case of Hungarian respondents, we could not find such coherence. 
Hungarian solidarity clusters rarely differ according to macro-level values. For 
example, self liftings and inclusives are more tolerant, while neoliberals and national 
exclusives show more trust towards the EU and UN compared to the anti-solidary 
group. But when thinking of social solidarity, people are rather driven by their 
individual problems, subjective positions, emotions and sentiments, rather than values, 
ideas or principles. 
 
8. Party affinity 
 
As a last step in our analysis, we looked at how much the various clusters were divided 
in relation to far-right political radicalism. In the past, in both in Hungary and Austria, 
we have witnessed the emergence of the political far right and populism, and we 
assumed that these political movements in terms of their social base would appear 
distinctly in the value profiles we revealed. 
In Austria, the situation is very divided. For three value profiles (anti-solidarity 
cluster 40 per cent, national exclusive cluster 33 per cent, self-lifting cluster 24 per 
cent), the group of far-right FPÖ and earlier (though politically ideologically related) 
BZÖ party supporters is relatively large and clearly over-represented. By contrast, the 
popularity of extreme right-wing parties is barely detectable in inclusive (3 per cent) 
and neoliberal-tolerant (9 per cent) clusters. If we look at our 2016 research results 
from the point of view of the electoral base of the current extremist and populist right-
wing coalition government, the polarization of respondents is observable, albeit to a 
lesser extent. 
71 per cent of the members of the anti-solidarity cluster, 59 per cent of the 
members of the national exclusive cluster, and 54 per cent of the self-lifting cluster 
members supported the coalition, compared to 20 per cent of the inclusive and 37 per 
cent of the neoliberal-tolerant clusters. From these results we can conclude that in 
Austria different values and ideological preferences are behind the rise of the extreme 
right-wing populism that seriously divides Austrian society. 
In the case of Hungarian society, the situation is different. Support for the 
extreme right party Jobbik is slightly different for each value cluster and ranges 
between 10 and 11 per cent. Only one group represents an exception, namely the 
anti-solidarity cluster, where the proportion of supporters is higher at 17 per cent.  
From this we can conclude that while Jobbik has basically based its political strategy 
on a strong process of ideological identity-building, voters do not support or reject 
Jobbik according to value profiles. 
This becomes more noticeable if we look at not only Jobbik but also at Jobbik 
and Fidesz voter preferences together. In this case, the proportion of potential 
supporters is very high as the governing party is included here too. Moreover, 
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although there are significant differences between the proportions of the clusters, 
support for the Fidesz–Jobbik political group is very high in all clusters (anti-solidarity 
cluster 92 per cent, national exclusive cluster 80 per cent, self-lifting cluster 79 per 
cent, inclusive cluster 63 per cent, neoliberal-tolerant 73 per cent). Thus attraction to a 
far-right ideology, independent of value segments and profiles, is widespread in 
Hungarian society: there was no single value cluster where the majority did not 




In our paper we have shown that the cognitive and structural dynamics of solidarity 
patterns in both Austria and Hungary are very similar. Based on its scope and 
foundations, the most exclusive cluster is the non-solidarian one in both countries. 
People who belong here are intolerant, blame people in need, and also support 
inequality in Austria, while they are slightly egalitarian in Hungary. This group is 
followed in size – based on its level of exclusivity – by the self-lifting cluster, which 
group supports only the nationally-merited. The next exclusive cluster is a nationally-
based one (national-exclusives) whose members favour supporting all nationals but not 
foreigners. Neoliberals are rather tolerant, but reject micro-solidarity in Hungary, 
while in Austria they seem to understand the need to support people in disadvantaged 
situations. Finally, inclusive solidarians show solidarity at each level we investigated. 
Comparing the relative weights of these clusters in the two countries separately, 
we observe huge similarities between the proportions of the clusters. The picture 
becomes more sophisticated if we compare the sizes of clusters with the help of a 
merged data file, however. The relative weight of the inclusive cluster decreases, while 
the relative proportions of non-solidarian and national-exclusive groups increase 
drastically in Hungary, which result confirms our findings from the SOCRIS project 
(with the exception of the rising proportion of non-solidarians). This means that 
although the dynamics and structures of different solidarity patterns are similar in the 
two countries, Hungary generally shows a significant shift in the level of solidarity 
compared to Austria. 
Explanations for the cluster memberships and party affinities are also different 
in the two countries but are similar to SOCRIS findings. While in Austria we find that 
mostly ideology- and value-based reasons circumscribe different choices related to 
different types of solidarity and party affinity, in Hungary, instead of coherent values 
and principles we find that individual problems and subjective perceptions explain 
solidarity patterns and a general tendency to right-wing radicalization, independent of 
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27 Towards immigrants. 
28 Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels. 
29 Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort. 
30 Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country. 
31 Personal unsafeness: feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark 
32 Large differences in income are NOT acceptable to reward talents and efforts 
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33 Men should NOT have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce. 
34 Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish. 
35 Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels. 
36 Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort. 
37 Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country. 
38 Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country. 
39 Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish. 
40 Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talents and efforts. 
41 Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country. 
